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This paper considers whether extending the on-the-job search model to account for endogenous search effort can help 
explain the shape of the wage distribution. More precisely, I show that it can be the case that the model generates 
hump-shaped wage distributions if preferences are non-separable between consumption and leisure.
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     1 Introduction
Since Burdett and Mortensen [1998] (BM henceforth), it is has been well
known that the on-the-job search model is characterized by equilibrium wage
dispersion, despite the fact that workers are ex ante homogenous. Neverthe-
less, this benchmark implies that the equilibrium wage density is increasing,
in contrast to the observed hump-shaped wage distribution.
Taking into account ex ante exogenous heterogeneity in job productivity
and worker ability improves the predictive power of the model. This allows
a good ﬁt with the wage distribution (see Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg [2000] and Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002]). However, the impact of
ex post heterogeneity is not clear cut. On the one hand, endogenous speciﬁc
human capital investments not only generate ex post productivity dispersion,
but it can also account for hump-shaped equilibrium wage distributions (see
Mortensen [2000], Quercioli [2005], Rosholm and Svarer [2004] or Chéron,
Hairault and Langot [2008]). On the other hand, the assumption of endoge-
nous search eﬀort no longer helps to circumvent the empirical shortcomings
of the BM model (see Mortensen [2003]). The intuition for this latter result
is as follows. Because the likelihood of ﬁnding a better oﬀer decreases with
the wage earned, this leads workers to reduce their search intensity whenever
their earnings are increasing. The search intensity ultimately falls to zero at
the top of the wage distribution. This provides incentives to ﬁrms to post
high wages, because the decrease in the search eﬀort for high levels of wages
raises the expected job duration.
This paper considers an extension of the BM model in order to generate a
non-strictly decreasing search eﬀort. To that end, we develop an on-the-job
search model with two types of jobs and non-separable preferences between
consumption and leisure. Computational experiments emphasize the poten-
tially signiﬁcant role of an endogenous search eﬀort. According to realis-
tic parameter values for preferences, it turns out that the model can imply
hump-shaped wage distributions despite the fact that workers are ex ante
homogenous.
2 Model
2.1 Environment and labor market ﬂows
We distinguish two types of job which can be thought of as corresponding to
diﬀerences in occupational categories. Let pi be the marginal productivity in
occupational category i = 1;2, and assume p1 < p2.
1Time is continuous. Homogenous workers exit unemployment at rate
¸0, and start working in type-1 jobs. Then, they work h hours, face job
destruction at rate ±, and search on-the-job not only for better opportunities
in p1-jobs, but also for p2-jobs, according to a search intensity s. A transition
from a p1-job to a p2-job typically features a promotion by switching jobs1.
The search is sequential and non-directed, and we let s¸i 8i = 1;2 denote the
arrival rates of jobs, either of type-1 or of type-2, increasing with the search
eﬀort. In p1 jobs, wages are posted by ﬁrms according to the standard wage
posting game. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin [2006] indeed emphasize that
the earnings of low-skilled workers are mainly related to this wage setting,
whereas the impact of bargaining power is greater for high-skilled workers.
We then consider that once an employee reaches a p2-job position, he earns
productivity p2. That is, we are assuming that the bargaining power of
workers in p2-jobs is one and, as a consequence, the worker stops searching
on-the-job. Nevertheless, those jobs also destroy at rate ±.2
Let us normalize to one the sum of unemployed workers and employees in
p1-jobs ; the steady state unemployment rate is given by u = ±
±+¸0.3 Then, let
G and F denote the cumulative distribution functions of earnings and wage
oﬀers in p1-jobs ; the stock of employees earning w or less is (1 ¡ u)G(w).
The outﬂows from this stock are related to (i) job destructions, (ii) p1-wage
oﬀers greater than w, and (iii) p2-job oﬀers. On the other hand, the inﬂows
into the stock (1 ¡ u)G(w) consist of unemployed workers who draw a wage
oﬀer below w. In steady-state, G(w) is derived from the following condition:
u¸0F(w) = (1¡u)
½








where g(w) ´ G0(w) is the density of wage earnings.
2.2 Intertemporal values of the workers
Let U, W1 and W2 denote the expected discounted lifetime income of unem-
ployed workers, and employees in p1 and p2-jobs, respectively. Unemployed
workers earn unemployment beneﬁts z and search for p1-job oﬀers. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider a binding minimum wage w high enough to
1For instance, a Technician who ﬁnds a Manager’s position in another ﬁrm.
2Allowing for a lower bargaining power for workers on p2-job position would add some
complexities but without modifying, at least qualitatively, our analysis of the wage distri-
bution impact of the search eﬀort function.
3Because all equilibrium wage oﬀers are greater than the unemployed worker’s reserva-
tion wage, the contact rate ¸0 gives the unemployment exit rate.
2imply that it is always in the unemployed worker’s interest to accept job
oﬀers. These value functions write as follows:










[W1(y) ¡ W1(w)]f(y)dy + s¸2 [W2(p2) ¡ W1(w)]
¾
rW2(p2) = V (p2;1 ¡ h) + ± [U ¡ W2(p2)]
where r denotes the interest rate, the function V is increasing and concave in
both arguments, and f(w) ´ F 0(w) is the density of wage oﬀers. Obviously,
it is always in workers’ interest to accept a wage greater than their current
earnings. Because p2 > p1, it is also true that w < p2 which implies W2(p2) >
W1(w), so that it is always in workers’ interest to accept a p2¡job oﬀer.
2.3 The wage setting process
The unconditional probability that an oﬀer w is accepted by a randomly
contacted worker, denoted by h1(w), is deﬁned by:
h1(w) ´
¸0u + (1 ¡ u)¸1
R w
w s(y)g(y)dy










A job-worker separation occurs either because of a job destruction or because
of a job-to-p1/p2-job transition, so that the employer’s value of a continuing
match, J1(w), solves the following asset pricing equation:
rJ1(w) = p1 ¡ w ¡ f± + ¸1[1 ¡ F(w)]s(w) + ¸2s(w)gJ1(w)
It is worth emphasizing that this expected job value highly depends on the
way the search eﬀort is related to p2-job opportunities. Importantly, there
is still an incentive for the highest-paid workers to search on-the-job for the
p2-position.
The wage posting policies of the ﬁrms solve the conventional problem
w = argfmaxw¸w h1(w)J1(w)g from which we derive the distribution of
wage oﬀers, F(w).
32.4 Optimal search eﬀort
The optimal search eﬀort of the worker is characterized by the following
ﬁrst-order condition:
V2(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s) = ¸1
Z w
w
[W1(y) ¡ W1(w)]f(y)dy + ¸2 [W2(p2) ¡ W1(w)]
so that s = s(w). Diﬀerentiating this optimal condition once again with
respect to w yields:
V22(w;1¡h¡s(w))s






where V22 · 0 and V21 ? 0. Usually (see Mortensen [2003]), it is both
assumed ¸2 = 0 and a separable utility function, that is V21(w;1¡h¡s) = 0;
in this case it unambiguously emerges that s(w) = 0 and s0(w) · 0 8w.
Our paper departs from these two parameter restrictions. This implies
that it is still worthwhile for the highest paid workers in p1-jobs to search
on-the-job, because they look forward to a p2-job. Furthermore, according to
V21 ? 0, the relation between the search eﬀort and wages becomes unclear:
- On the one hand, as usual, the higher the wage of the worker, the lower
the probability of ﬁnding a p1-job oﬀer with a higher wage.
- On the other hand, if V21(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s) < 0, a higher wage decreases
the marginal value of leisure (reduces the marginal cost of the search).
Then, it could be the case that this eﬀect is high enough to account for
an increasing relationship between the search eﬀort and wage earnings.4
3 Equilibrium Search Eﬀort and the Shape of
the Wage Distribution
3.1 Labor market equilibrium and calibration
The labor market equilibrium can be summarized by a system which jointly
deﬁnes fF(w);s(w)g. Let us consider the particular case where r ! 0. We
have:
4On the contrary, if V21(w;1¡h¡s) > 0, the search eﬀort is unambiguously increasing
with wages.
4f(w) =
± + ¸1[1 ¡ F(w)]s(w) + s(w)¸2
2s(w)¸1(p1 ¡ w)
+




V21(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s(w)) +
¸1[1¡F(w)]
±+s(w)¸1[1¡F(w)]+s(w)¸2V1(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s(w))
V22(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s(w))
where F(w) and s(w) satisfy the following boundary conditions:
F(w) = 0














[1 ¡ F(y)]V1(y;1 ¡ h ¡ s(y)
± + s(y)¸1 + s(y)¸2
¶
dy
and w is given by F(w) = 1.
We consider the following CRRA speciﬁcation of the utility function:








1¡½ (if ½ 6= 1)
®log(w) + (1 ¡ ®)log(1 ¡ h ¡ s) (if ½ = 1)
with ½ ¸ 0;® 2 [0;1], and where the value of ½ with respect to 1 determines
the sign of the cross-partial V12(w;1 ¡ h ¡ s). Our main purpose is then
to emphasize on the explaining role played by the search eﬀort. Therefore,
simulations aim at showing how sensitive is the equilibrium wage oﬀer dis-
tribution with respect to parameter ½. Other parameters are set in a fairly
standard way to provide illustrative simulations (see Table 1).
h ® w p1 p2 ± ¸0 ¸1 ¸2
1/3 2/3 1 5 10 0.1 1 0.3 ¸1=10
3.2 Computational experiments
Figure 1 shows our simulation results for search eﬀort and wage oﬀer density
functions according to plausible empirical values of risk-aversion parameter
½5. When ½ = 1, separability between consumption and leisure leads to
5For instance King and Rebelo [1999] consider ½ = 3 in their Handbook of Macroeco-
nomics’ paper.
5Figure 1. Illustrative simulations






































































































































































































































6the conventional Burdett-Mortensen outcome: the search eﬀort (earnings
density) is a decreasing (increasing) function of wages.
If we consider ½ > 1, it turns out that the search eﬀort can rise with
wages, at least for high levels of earnings. Despite the fact that the likeli-
hood of accepting a p1-job oﬀer decreases when workers’ wages rise, higher
earnings also account for higher consumption, and this provides incentives
to workers to increase their search eﬀort as a means of reaching p2-jobs. In-
terestingly, if the strength of the latter mechanism is high enough, the wage
oﬀer density is hump-shaped.6 Indeed, because for high level of wages work-
ers raise their search eﬀort, this reduces ﬁrms’ expectations of job duration.
As compared to an equilibrium with a decreasing search eﬀort function, this
provides incentives to ﬁrms to post lower wages. Then, it can be the case
that the overall wage distribution is hump-shaped.
The main concern is then the following: how plausible is a non-strictly
decreasing shape of the (unobservable) eﬀort function? From an empirical
standpoint, Bowlus and Neuman [2006] ﬁrst noticed by using US data that
the job-to-job transition rate rises as the wage increases. Using French data,
Chéron and Ding [2008] also emphasized that the probability of a transi-
tion to a higher skill-occupation is increasing with wages. This occurs more
speciﬁcally for Technician-Manager job-to-job transitions. These empirical
ﬁndings cast some doubts on the empirical plausibility of the standard BM
model. The fact that workers’ search eﬀort increases as wages rise, as implied
by our framework, could be an explanation of those empirical ﬁndings.
4 Concluding remarks
To conclude, it seems worth discussing a direct extension of this work. One
may indeed wonder to what extent labor market equilibrium properties de-
pend on the bargaining power of workers in p2-jobs, which here is assumed to
be one. For values between zero and one, wage earnings would be a weighted
average of productivity p2 and workers’ reservation wages. Accordingly, a
hump-shaped p1-distribution of wages would account for a hump-shaped dis-
tribution of those reservation wages. Consequently, this should also con-
tribute to generating a hump-shaped p2-distribution of wages. We leave this
extension of our canonical model for future research.
6Higher values for ½ could also imply a strictly decreasing wage oﬀer density.
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